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Abstract
Recently, an image block encryption algorithm was proposed based on some well-known chaotic maps. The authors claim
that the encryption algorithm achieves enough security level and high encryption speed at the same time. However, we
find that there are some critical security defects in the algorithm. In this paper, we give a thorough security analysis on
the algorithm from the perspective of modern cryptography. Given one pair of known plain-image and its corresponding
cipher-image, the attacker can obtain an equivalent secret key to successfully decrypt the other cipher-images encrypted with
the same secret-key. In addition, each security metric adopted in the security evaluation on the algorithm is questioned. The
drawn lessons are generally applicable to many other image encryption algorithms.
Keywords: image encryption, cryptanalysis, plaintext attack, image privacy, multimedia content protection.
1. Introduction
With the development of the Internet and social media
platform, people often share their photos on the Internet
with more and more higher frequency. However, these pho-
tos may contain rich privacy information. If they are ac-
cessed by some unauthorized person, serious consequences
may happen for the involved parties. Therefore, in the pro-
cess of image transmission on the network, protecting im-
age information from being leaked and stolen has become
a focus in the field of information security [1, 2]. In recent
years, more and more image encryption algorithms have
been proposed to withstand the challenge [3, 4, 5].
A number of image encryption algorithms based on var-
ious chaotic systems are proposed due to their special char-
acteristics, such as sensitivity to change of initial con-
dition, unpredictability, randomness and high complexity
[12, 6]. For example, Hua’s encryption algorithm proposed
in [7] uses 2-D Logistic-adjusted-sine map as a pseudo-
random number generator (PRNG); 4-D piecewise logis-
tic map with coupled parameters are adopted as a PRNG
in [8]. However, in the design of image encryption algo-
rithm based on chaotic systems, many designers ignored
their negative side: obvious dynamics degradation of any
chaotic system in a digital domain [9, 10, 11]. This defect
may cause the invalidity of chaotic domain, so many inse-
cure encryption algorithms have been successfully cracked
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[12, 13]. It can be seen that a chaos-based encryption algo-
rithm may own several special security defects that do not
exist in the non-chaotic encryption methods [12, 14, 15].
In [16], a chaotic image encryption algorithm was pro-
posed, where three different chaotic maps are used as a
PRNG for controlling pixel shuffling, blocking size, and
value encryption. A simple chaotic map is used to deter-
mine block size and generate pseudo-random binary se-
quence for each block. Especially, the sum of pixels of
plain-image is used to build up a sensitivity mechanism of
the encryption result on the plaintext. However, we found
the security defects of the chaos-based PRNG and canceled
the sensitivity mechanism. As for one round version of
the algorithm, we can derive the secret-key with a chosen-
plaintext attack. In addition, each used security metric is
questioned from the point of view of modern cryptanalysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents a description of the analyzed algorithm. Detailed
cryptanalytic results are given in Sec. 3. The last section
concludes the paper.
2. The image block encryption algorithm based on
three chaotic maps
Assume that the gray-scale plain-image is denoted as
matrix I of size M × N. As specified in [16], three chaotic
maps are used, namely Arnold map, Baker map, and Lo-
gistic map. They are used for permuting position of plain-
image, dividing the plain-image into four blocks, and gen-
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erate the encryption sequences {mp} and {tp}, respectively.
The encryption algorithm can be described as follows.
• Generating permutation position with Arnold map(
p
q
)
=
(
1 b
a ab + 1
) (
i
j
)
mod N, (1)
where a, b and N are parameters; (i, j) represents the
position of the pixel at the i-th row and the j-th column
of the plain-image I; (p, q) represents the permutation
position of (i, j).
• Calculating block size with Baker map
(xn+1, yn+1)
=
(xn/µ, µ · yn) if 0 < x ≤ µ;((xn − µ)/µ∗, µ∗yn + µ) if µ < x ≤ 1, (2)
where µ is the control parameter of the equation, µ∗ =
1−µ. Set the initial value of Baker map (2) as (x0, y0),
and iterate it n times. Then, transform the generated
sequences {xi}ni=1, {yi}ni=1 into integer vectors by func-
tions f (x) = bM · xc and f (x) = bN · xc, respectively.
Finally, the last pair of sequences (u, v) is selected as
the block size of the first block.
• Generating the random encryption sequence {mp} and
{tp} with Logistic map
g(x) = r · x · (1 − x), (3)
where x is the state variable, r is the control parameter.
Setting an initial value z0, a sequence {zi} can be gener-
ated by iterating Eq. (3), which is further transformed
into an integer sequence {mp} via
h1(x) =
⌊
x · 105
⌋
mod 256. (4)
Then, set 
s0(2) = (s0(1) + 0.5) mod 1;
s0(3) = (s0(1) + s0(2)) mod 1;
s0(4) = (s0(2) + s0(3)) mod 1,
where s0(1) is a sub-key. Setting s0(1) as an initial
condition, generate sequence {si} by iterating integer
logistic map
g∗(x) = 4 · x · (256 − x)/256. (5)
Then, transform it into integer sequence {tp} by
h2(x) =
⌊
x · 106
⌋
mod 256. (6)
• The encryption procedure:
Step 1: Permute the relative positions of every pixel of
I with the permutation relation determined by Arnold
map (1) and obtain shuffled image E.
Step 2: Divide the shuffled image E into four sub-
images based on Baker map (2). Then, exchange
the position of pixel at entry (0, 0) with that at entry
(u, v). The initial values will be selected to be (x0 +
mean{I}/256 mod 1) and (y0 + mean{I}/256 mod 1),
where mean{·} denotes the mean value of pixels of
plain-image I.
Step 3: Generate the random encryption control se-
quence {tp} and {mp} utilizing Logistic map (3) by us-
ing initial value (z0 + mean{I}/256 mod 1).
Step 4: Encrypt the four sub-images by the generated
sequences {tp} and {mp} via
a∗i j =
ai j + mp · tp mod 256 if mp = 255;ai j + (mp + 1) · tp mod 256 otherwise.
(7)
Step 5: Combine all the encrypted sub-images and ob-
tain encrypted image I∗.
• The decryption procedure is the inverse version of the
encryption algorithm by using the same secret-key,
namely
ai j =
a∗i j − mp · tp mod 256 if mp = 255;a∗i j − (mp + 1) · tp mod 256 otherwise.
3. Cryptanalysis
3.1. Known-plaintext attack
In the original encryption algorithm, it is divided into
three parts to encrypt the original image. Include image
shuffling, image blocking, and sub-image encryption. The
flow diagram is shown in Fig. 1.
Through the analysis of the original paper, we can know
that the generation of random sequence is closely related
to the mean value of pixels of the original image. If the
same secret keys are used, different random sequences will
be generated for different mean value of pixels. However,
although the images are different, it is still possible to pro-
duce the same mean value of pixels. Therefore, as long as
the image with the same mean value of pixels is used, it can
be attacked with the same secret keys.
Given one pair of plain-image and corresponding en-
crypted image, when the following two conditions are true,
we can attack the given ciphered image. Condition 1: the
2
Plain image I
aij
Shuffled image E
ai'j'
Encrypted image I*
ci'j'
Image shuffling
Sub-image 
encryptionImage blocking
Sub- image E1~E4
E1 E2
E3 E4
ai'j'
Figure 1: The flow chart of the original encryption algorithm: ai j denotes the pixel value at the i-th row and the j-th column, as well as ai′ j′ and ci′ j′ .
ciphered image uses the same secret keys (x0, y0, z0, r) as
the given encrypted image; condition 2: the decipher im-
age has the same sum of pixels as the given plain-image.
For the sake of illustration, we can transform Eq. (7) into
a∗i j = (ai j + Pi j) mod 256, (8)
where P represents the equivalent encryption image, the
results of the interaction of tp and mp; Pi j is used to change
the pixel value at the i-th row and the j-th column of the
shuffled image E.
3.2. Locating the permutation position of the first pixel of
the plain-image
Assume that the sum of pixels of the plain-image is de-
noted as η. If the generation of random sequence has noth-
ing to do with the sum of pixels of the plain-image, we
know that as long as we use an image with all zero pixels,
we can get the equivalent encryption image P. However,
since the encryption algorithm is related to the sum of pix-
els of the plain-image, we need to ensure that the sum of
pixels is the same as the plain-image, so we need to adjust
the value of the first pixel to η. There is only one differ-
ent element between the encrypted image obtained from
such an image and the equivalent encryption image P of
the plain-image I. Because of the permutation operation,
the different element is the value at permutation position of
the first pixel in the plain-image I.
Therefore, we first need to find the permutation position
of the first pixel in the plain-image, then obtain the equiv-
alent encryption image P in Eq. (8). So, we choose three
pairs of images whose sum of pixels are the same as the
plain-image.
The permutation position of the first pixel in the plain-
image can be computed by the following steps.
Step 1: Choose a plain-image q1 to attack with all zero
pixels except q1(1, 1) = η and the corresponding cipher
image is supposed to be Q1, where
q1 =

η 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

. (9)
Step 2: Choose a plain-image q2 to attack with all zero
pixels except q2(1, 1) = η − 1 and q2(1, 2) = 1, and the
corresponding cipher image is supposed to be Q2, where
q2 =

η − 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

. (10)
Step 3: Choose a plain-image q3 to attack with all zero
pixels except q3(1, 1) = η − 1 and q3(1, 3) = 1, and the
corresponding cipher image is supposed to be Q3, where
q3 =

η − 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

. (11)
Step 4: Compare Q1 and Q2. The result of operation
is recorded as Q12. We can find that there should be two
different pixels between Q1 and Q2. Therefore, there would
be two zero values in Q12. Q12 can be expressed as
Q12 = (Q1 == Q2).
We know that the positions of the two generated zero el-
ements are the permutation positions of the (1, 1) and (1, 2)
of the plain-image.
Step 5: Compare difference between Q1 and Q3. The re-
sult of operation is recorded as Q13. We can find that there
3
should be two different pixels between Q1 and Q3. There-
fore, there would be two zero values in Q13. Q13 can be
expressed as
Q13 = (Q1 == Q3).
We know that the positions of the two generated zero el-
ements are the permutation positions of the (1, 1) and (1, 3)
of the plain-image.
Step 6: Compare the locations of step 4 with step 5. Find
the same location, where the element is zero in Q12 and
Q13, and that position is the permutation position of (1, 1).
The specific legend is shown in Fig. 2. In this legend,
assuming that the sum of pixels of the plain-image is 575
(η = 575), the three plain-images selected are shown in
Fig. 2 in turn. The calculation method described above is
shown in detail in the schematic diagram. Therefore, we
can finally get the permutation position of the first pixel.
3.3. Finding the equivalent encryption image P and ob-
taining the shuffled image E
Encrypting the plain-image I, and the corresponding en-
crypted image is I∗. Based on the above analysis, we know
Q1 is identical to P except Q1(u, v), because of its value is
modified. So, the pixel of Q1(u, v) subtract the sum of pix-
els (η) of the plain-image, then we can derive the equivalent
encryption image P = Q1, where
Q1(u, v) = (Q1(u, v) − η) mod 256. (12)
We have obtained the equivalent encryption image P, for
a given encrypted image, such as a cameraman, the en-
crypted image I∗ subtracting the equivalent encryption im-
age P, we can derive the shuffled image E by
E = (I∗ − P) mod 256. (13)
3.4. Obtaining the original image by permutation rule
After getting the shuffled image, we can use the method
in [17] to get the permutation rule, and then obtain the
plain-image.
If the plain-image I is stretched into a vector row by row,
the pixel locations would be a vector by A0 = {k}M∗N−1k=0 ,
which can be expanded to a 2-digit representation in base
256 as follows. The location matrix O can be expressed as
O =

(0)(0) (0)(1) (0)(2) · · · (0)(255)
(1)(0) (1)(1) (1)(2) · · · (1)(255)
...
...
...
...
...
(254)(0) (254)(1) (254)(2) · · · (254)(255)
(255)(0) (255)(1) (255)(2) · · · (255)(255)

M×N
.
Each element in O is a number in base 256. Then,
two chosen plain-images with entries 0,1,2,,254,255 are ob-
tained by splitting matrix O into two images
O0 =

0 1 2 · · · 255
0 1 2 · · · 255
...
...
...
...
...
0 1 2 · · · 255
0 1 2 · · · 255

M×N
and
O1 =

0 0 0 · · · 0
1 1 1 · · · 1
...
...
...
...
...
254 254 254 · · · 254
255 255 255 · · · 255

M×N
.
To keep the sum of pixels of these images consistent with
the plain-image, as Sec. 3.2, the first pixels in two chosen
plain-images can be calculated bysumOe =
M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
Oe(i, j) −Oe(1, 1),
Oe(1, 1) = η − sumOe,
where e = (0, 1).
The permutation cryptanalysis steps are expressed as fol-
lows:
Step 1: Encrypt two images O0 and O1, and obtain cor-
responding encrypted images C0 and C1.
Step 2: Obtain the shuffled images OM0 and OM1 in
Sec. 3.3.
Step 3: Derive the permutation rule l.
First, we should get Oc = {Oc(i, j)}M,Ni=1, j=1 calculated by
Oc = 256OM1 + OM0.
Because the first pixels in O0 and O1 are adjusted, the el-
ement Oc(u, v) is wrong. But, the rest locations are correct;
the correct Oc(u, v) can be calculated by
sumOc =
( M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
Oc(i, j)
)
−Oc(u, v),
Oc(u, v) =
( MN−1∑
k=0
k
)
− sumOc.
Therefore, the permutation rule l described by vector L0
can be obtained by stretching Oc to a vector row by row.
Making use of L0, we can obtain the original plain-image I
from the shuffled image E. The specific legend is shown in
Fig. 3.
From the figure, we can see that the permutation position
of the first pixel is (4, 4), which is consistent with the result
calculated in section 3.2, which proves that this method is
correct. The sum of pixel of the legend image is 575(η =
575).
4
 Q13 
Q12 
Q3 
Q2 
Q1 
q3 
q2 
I
*
 E I 
q1 
575 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 575 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
 
40 154 8 12 136 
44 108 252 74 28 
0 159 172 222 164 
92 234 242 195 140 
112 192 142 96 248 
 
574 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 574 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
40 154 8 12 136 
44 108 252 75 28 
0 159 172 222 164 
92 234 242 194 140 
112 192 142 96 248 
 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 574 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
574 0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
 
 40 154 8 12 136 
44 108 252 74 28 
0 160 172 222 164 
92 234 242 194 140 
112 192 142 96 248 
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1 1 1 1 1 
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Figure 2: The process of locating the permutation position of the first pixel of the plain-image.
 
O0 C0 
C1 
41 158 11 14 137 
47 110 253 74 32 
1 159 176 225 166 
96 237 244 145 140 
114 193 142 100 251 
 
OM1 
1 4 3 2 1 
3 2 1 0 4 
1 0 4 3 2 
4 3 2 13 0 
2 1 0 4 3 
 
O
C
 
7 21 17 13 9 
18 14 5 1 22 
6 2 23 19 10 
24 15 11 0 3 
12 8 4 20 16 
 
11 12 13 14 15 
16 17 18 19 20 
21 22 23 24 25 
26 27 28 29 30 
31 32 33 34 35 
 
I E 
18 32 28 24 20 
29 25 16 12 33 
17 13 34 30 21 
35 26 22 11 14 
23 19 15 31 27 
 
O1 
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1 1 1 1 1 
2 2 2 2 2 
3 3 3 3 3 
4 4 4 4 4 
 
0  1  2  3  4  
0  1  2  3  4  
0  1  2  3  4  
0  1  2  3  4  
0  1  2  3  4  
 
42 155 10 15 140 
47 112 252 75 30 
1 161 175 226 164 
96 234 243 145 143 
114 195 146 96 249 
 
OM0 
2 1  2  3  4  
3  4  0  1  2  
1  2  3  4  0  
4  0  1  13 3  
2  3  4  0  1  
 
I
*
 
58 186 36 36 156 
73 133 12 86 61 
17 172 206 252 185 
127 4 8 143 154 
135 211 157 127 19 
 
Figure 3: The process of calculating the permutation rule l.
3.5. The deciphering process of a given cipher image
Based on the above analysis, the decryption steps can be
described as follows.
Step 1: Locate the permutation position of the first pixel of
the plain-image.
Step 2: Find the equivalent encryption image P.
Step 3: Get the shuffled image.
Step 4: Obtain the plain-image.
In order to testify the correctness of our attack method,
we performed the experiment with some secret keys. When
the secret keys and parameter are set as [16], namely x0 =
0.123, y0 = 0.456, n = 10000, s0(1) = 0.789, z0 = 0.147
5
and r = 3.999. The plain-image “cameraman” and its re-
sults of encryption and decryption are shown in Fig. 4 and
Fig. 5.
original-image shuffled-image encrypted-image
Figure 4: Images of encryption process.
3.6. Security defects
The original paper uses the general security evaluation
criteria in most of the papers to prove the security of the
proposed encryption algorithm. However, we try to prove
that these evaluation criteria are not completely correct. We
will refute and prove our opinions one by one according to
the order of security analysis in the original paper.
• Histogram analysis
In [16], it is stated that “The readability of image
would be less effective with the smoother histogram
distribution”. As shown in [10], although attackers can
not get some meaningful information from the pixels
of uniform histogram, they can restore some impor-
tant statistical information about the plain-image by
changing the counting objects of the histogram from
pixel to bit. In addition, an example shows that the his-
togram of two encrypted graphs remains unchanged,
but this encryption algorithm is also safe enough for
some specific scenes, which has proposed in paper
[18]. Therefore, the two histograms calculated in
terms of pixel shown in [16] are not enough to prove
that the proposed encryption algorithm has better se-
curity.
• Variance of histogram
equivalent-P-
image
obtain-shuffled-
image
obtain-
decrypted-image
Figure 5: Images of decryption process.
Evaluate the uniformity of an encrypted image by cal-
culating the variance of histogram. In [16], it is said
that “The lower value of variances indicates the higher
uniformity of encrypted images. Comparing with the
variance of histogram of the plaintext image, we have
that the proposed algorithm is efficient and can resist
such statistical attacks effectively”. In fact, the vari-
ance of histogram can not measure the number of dif-
ferent pixel value in the encrypted histogram. Such
as: the variances of two histograms “2, 2, 3, 3, 4, 7”
and “2, 2, 3, 3, 5, 6” are different, but their number of
different combinations are the same. Besides, in [19]
can prove that the variance of histogram of encrypted
image obtained by insecure encryption algorithm can
also obtain very low.
• Key space analysis
In [16], the precision of the secret key is fixed as 10−14.
However, as shown in [20], in digital computer, the
precision can only be precisely specified by a power
of two. If data is represented in floating-point format
binary32 or binary64, the distance between adjacent
representable numbers is not even, so the length of
mantissa fraction and exponential fraction need to be
set carefully in [11]. Therefore, it is not entirely cor-
rect to say that there are very rich secret keys to resist
different kinds of brute force attacks.
• Key sensitivity analysis
In [16], through changing one of its five keys to a small
change of 10−14, to show the impact of the so-called
small changes of the secret key on the encryption and
decryption process, and then prove the key sensitivity
of the algorithm. However, in the computer, any cal-
culation is based on binary system, so the sensitivity
of secret keys is not credible by using the method of
decimal system.Observing Eq. (3) and (5), one can see
thatx and (1 − x)(x and 256 − x) are equivalent if Lo-
gistic map is implemented in a fixed-point arithmetic
domain.
Due to the modulo addition in Eq. (4), there may ex-
ist even much more equivalent secret keys. Besides
these, quantization effects of the digital chaotic map
may generate the same iteration orbit for different ini-
tial conditions. Therefore, the sensitivity of encryp-
tion results to key change is very weak.
• Correlation analysis
In [16], a popular measurement method is used to cal-
culate the correlation degree of adjacent pixels in the
horizontal direction, vertical direction and diagonal di-
rection. They think the ideal value should be close to
6
0, so the lower the calculated value between adjacent
pixels, the better the encryption algorithm. However,
there have been objections in recent years. In paper
[19], several insecure encryption algorithms are se-
lected to calculate the correlation among adjacent pix-
els in the horizontal direction, vertical direction and
diagonal direction, and the value is close to 0, which
proves the error of the measurement method. Finally,
they come to a conclusion: “There is no clear (statis-
tic) decision criterion for passing this test.” A visual
inspection would thus mistake two insecure ciphers as
secure.
• Information entropy analysis
Information entropy is used to measure the “random-
ness” of an encrypted image and a perfect encrypted
image should thus get close to 8. But experiments
show that this is only a necessary condition, not a suf-
ficient condition. There are still many encryption al-
gorithms with poor security, but the entropy value of
the encrypted image is close to 8 perfectly. The exam-
ple is proved in [19].
• Resistance to differential attack analysis
Two parameters NPCR and UACI are used to evaluate
the sensitivity to plaintext. When the result achieves
the ideal value, they think the encryption algorithm is
extremely sensitive to plaintext and can resist differen-
tial attack effectively for different images. However,
the values for four insecure ciphers are above 99%,
which is comparable to the best NPCR values found
in the literature on chaos-based ciphers. In particular,
this value is virtually identical to that of the so far un-
broken 2D logistic map encryption algorithm in [19].
Therefore, this criterion for measuring encryption se-
curity is not credible.
• Robustness analysis
In original paper, different levels of noise and data
loss are used to prove the robustness of the algorithm.
However, we find that there is a big hidden danger in
the encryption algorithm. Before decryption, the de-
cryptor needs to obtain the transmitted mean value of
pixels of the original image accurately. However, in
practice, this value is not easily transmitted correctly.
Through the experimental simulation, we find that the
original image can not be decrypted correctly when
the mean value of pixels with different precision is
only one bit different. However, we can not guarantee
that every bit will not be lost in the transmission pro-
cess. Therefore, we think this encryption algorithm is
not robust enough.
• Algorithm speed analysis
In [16], by comparing several different encryption al-
gorithms, the author gets the conclusion that their al-
gorithm has the best operation speed. Actually, the
fast speed is build on sacrificing security instead of
better structure. In Eq. (4) and (6), authors use the
general integer conversion functions, namely
fn(x) = f (10m · x) mod D, (14)
where m and D are positive integers; f (x) is an quan-
tization function, for example ceil, round and floor. In
computer, constant multiplication is performed by a
series of bitwise shifts and addition operations. There-
fore, the computational complexity of the conversion
is proportional to m. Only
⌈
log2 D
⌉
bits are available,
the other m
⌈
log2 10
⌉−⌈log2 D⌉ bits are wasted. Taking
Eq. (4) as an example, the utilization percentage of the
computation cost on iterating Logistic map (3) is only
dlog2 De
mdlog2 10e =
dlog2 256e
5dlog2 10e =
2
5 .
4. Conclusion
This paper analyzed the security of image block encryp-
tion algorithm based on chaotic maps. Every used security
metric is incapable to prove real security performance. We
summarized the security defects to inform designers of im-
age encryption algorithms about common pitfalls. Besides,
much cryptanalytic works should be done to bridge the gap
among nonlinear science, cryptography and security.
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